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Abstract
In this paper 1 wish to address one or Mo problems related to the treatment
of natural language connectives within the fra mework of Relevance theory.
In particular, I will address the problem ofthe constrainability of the theory
while I will only just raise the problem of globality. I take the view that
while Relevance theory may well provide an initial fi rst order treatment of
connectives it is incapable of accounting for the most interesting aspects of
their meanings and functions on grounds of the maxim of Relevance alone
as this would pos it no independent constraints beyond the competence ofthe
individual speaker.
1. Introduction: The pro ble m posed by na tu r al lan guage connectives
A well known and most intriguing problem in the area of the philosophy of
language and, more recently, in pragmatics is the discrepancy between
natural language connectives and their logical counterparts. While in logic p
& q is true if both p and q are true, irrespective of their order (q & p ). this is
not so in natural language . Moreover, depending on the type of clauses and
(and other connectives, too) conjoins, various non-logica l aspects of
meaning are generated, such as locality (1a) , consequence (t b), temporality
(I c), and so on:
(la) John was in the kitchen and was cooking dinner.
( lb) John tripped over and broke a leg.
( le ) John came home and had dinner.
Grice (1967, 1975) claimed that these further non-logical aspects of
meaning are non-linguistica lly encoded (that is, they are not part of the
conventional meaning of and), but are rather implicated. In rejecting the
view that these aspects of meaning are linguistically encoded. Grice was in
effect 'rescuing' logical semantics, a program that can be called minimalist,
as against the maxima list approach that would endorse the ambiguity thesis
(see Posner, 1980).
The implicatures generated by connect ives are computed on the basis of a
number of maxims deriving from the Cooperat ive Principle (Grice 1967,
1975). However, the maxims posited by Grice were much too genera l and
unconstrained to effect ively account for the variability of implicaturcs (see
Koutoupis-Kitis 1982, Kitis forthcoming(a], (bD,
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2. T he Relevance account
Sperber and Wilson (19 86) (henceforth S&W) proposed Relevance theory
as providing the only maxim, that of Relevance. needed to tackle all such
problems . In processing O b). for example. the hearer \\111 search for an
interpretation that is consistent with the principle of Relevance. In other
words, the extra effort needed for processing the conj unction of the two
propositions \\111be compensated for by the rele vant assumption of why he
broke a leg, tha t is. by deriving the relevant premis es of conseque nce
bet ween p and q.
In particular. Blakemore (1987). working within the Relevance theory
framework (S&\V, 1986 ). gave an account of natural language conjunction
"in terms of constraints on the inferential computations the hearer performs
in order to establish the impact of that proposition-c-or. in other words. its
re levance ." (18). This account was based on the assumption that "not all
lingu istic meaning can be defined solely in terms of input to the processes
tha t deli ver prepositional representations of the world . Some linguist ic
meaning actually provides an instruction as to the way in which the
proposition recovered is to be processed for relevance." (ibid.: 18).
In other words, Bl akemore says that the meaning of connectives is not
representational like tha t of lexica l items such as husband and wife but
procedura l or instructional. Discourse connectives tell us how to treat the
conceptual representations of the utt erances. This is why she calls them
'semantic constraint s'. They con strain, so to speak, the interpretation of the
utterances. And as linguistic constraints, they constrain the context of the
utte rances, too. This process of con straining utterances is to be understood
in terms of re lating them to the discourse.
Summing up, we can say that she suggests the follo wing ways in which
discourse conne ctives constrain information conveyed by an utterance and
made relevant:
a. They allo w the derivation of a contextual implication (e.g.,
so,theref ore. too).
b. They strengthen an existing assumption , by providing better evidence
for it (e.g., after all, moreover, f urthermore)
c. They may contradict an existing assum ption (e.g., however, still,
nevertheless. but)
d. They may specify' the role of the utterance in the discourse (e.g.,
any,VQJ', incidentally . by the ,vaJ', fin ally).
(adap ted from Fraser)
3. M y proposal (1982)
A very similar account, though in retrosp ect I would say that it was an
anterior hybrid between a Blakcmorcan and a Schiffrinean account, \\/3S
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proposed in Koutoupis-Kitis (1982), long before the adven t of Relevance
theory or the: discourse-analytic perspective for connectives introduced by
Schiffrin (1987). Indeed, after criticising in depth the most prevalent
accounts of connect ives, such as R.Lakoff (1971), G. Lakoff (1971) , van
Dij k ( 1977) and Dascal and Katrie l (1977). I offered an accoun t primarily of
but within an interactional framework.' Instead of Relevance . which
incidentall y I suggested that should he: the sole supcrrnuxim as its role was
pivotal in language use (see also Kitis forthcoming[a]), I proposed that we
view clauses introduced by connectives in terms of the main directionality
of the discourse. I think this concept is a close conceptual approx imation of
what later S&W ( 1986) called Relevance, though I did not elaborate it in
allY sense . However, as my approach was more attuned to a discourse -
analytic perspective, directionality was a rath er more global and
comprehensive notion. I wrote :
It seems that not only the configuration of the clausal constructions within the
utterance, but also the configuration of the utterances within a piece of discourse.
is determined by the purpose of the utterance in relation to the goals of the
conversation.. ..The configuration of our clauses and utterances will then reflect
the significance we assign to our moves represented in these clausesor utterances.
(94)
But, in part icular, which was analysed paradigmatically, was charac terised
as a kind of "orientating signal", a close approximation to Blakemore's
( 1987) notion of procedural mean ing. I write:
It [bul] can characterise the nature of the next move in the light of what has
preceded. (96)
And further down, I wr ite that but is a metalinguistic device and its function
is to characterise inter-clausal relations. From all this it seems pretty obvious
that I should find no faults 'with a Relevance-theoretic account of
connectives.
4. My (current) problem
As is well known many quest ions have been raised in relation to Relevance
theo ry in general and, more part icular ly, with respect to a Relevance-
theoretic treatment of connectives , despite the cult that it inaugurated.'
However. as 1 claim at length with reference to certain uses of connectives
'Much later it was pointed out to me that my account was \<: 1)' similar to Ducrot's
account; however, it was arrivedat independently.
lOne must not disregard that there has been prolific research on the area of
connectives within the framework of Relevance. Sec, for example, Jucker and Ziv,
1998.
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in Kitis (forthcoming[b ]). a most recalcitran t problem that one will
encounte r in a Rele vance-theoretic approach is that of constra inability as
pose d in the following question. '
Question:
wha t is it that
spea ker?
If connectives constrain the interpretation of our utte rances
can constrain the use of those connec tives? Is it j ust the
Blakemore, in more than one place. stre sses the speaker's potentia l for
guaranteeing optimal relevance or what I might ca ll the speaker's
unconstrained omni potence; for example. she writes:
Neve rtheless it does seem to be the case that by producing an utterance of a
particular form a speaker may give a guarantee not just that the information she is
offering is relevant, but that it is relevant in a specific context- or, in other words.
that it is relevant in a particular way. (76)
Le t's take one partic ular connective. so. and examine what Blakemore
ident ifies as its function in discour se. This connec tive signa ls that the
follo wing segment/pro pos ition is IQ be interpreted as a conclusion, whic h
follows from the prior discourse. Blakemore (1987: 85) offers the fol lowing
example :
(2) A: You take the first turni ng on the left.
B; So I don't go past the hospital.
She wri tes :
B's utterance is relevant as confirmation of (or as a request for confirmation of)
me relevance of A's utterance. That is, she is confirming that me proposition her
utterance expresses is indeed a contextual implication of A's utterance. (85)
Or, in some other cases, so may be used to draw attent ion 10 an implication
of a previous utterance for all sorts of reasons:
(3) A: Tom's car isn't here .
B ; So he decided not to come after a ll.
l it is ....onh noting. however, that in Kitis (1982) I proposed Relevance as the
supermaxim under ....bose scope all other maxims should fall and as the orJy maxim
that is initially implicated in the derivation of particularised conversational
implicarures. vtoreover. in anticipation of Sperber and wil son ( t 986). I claimed that
much of ....hat was then considered to be conversational implicarures ....ere just
contextual assumptions. (Cr. Kitis fonhcoming(a)).
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Indeed. Blakemorc mentions some more cases of so, too: So. she writes.
may preface an afterthought or a repa ir:
In some cases it seems that a speaker \....iIl present a proposition as a conclusion
simply in order to specify the relevance of a previously presented proposition, or,
in other words. simply to meet the need created by the hearer's apparent inability
to establish the relevance of the previous remark.
And she concludes:
More importantly, in such cases the fact that the speaker has presented a
proposition Q in a sequence P. So Q need not indicate anything more than a belief
that thc hearer wants a specification of the relevance of P. (90)
In other cases, however, Q may not be expected to be derived by the
hearer on the basis of P on her own initiat ive and Q, in such cases cannot be
afterthoughts.
Whether So q indicates 3 belief that the hearer wants a specification of the
relevance of P or wnether it brings about an underlyi ng inferential
connection of a generalised character (ibid. : 88), it is quite obvious that
Blakemore's account of so as it stands. totally unconstrained by any
canonisation or generalisation of background knowledge and inferential
processes, cannot explain its function in the follow-ing cartoon text:
Two young guys conversing:
A: I don't believe this! Grandpa declared all his income to the Inland
Revenue this year!
B: SO he's still brain-damaged from the stroke!
A: Yeah, life sucks!
Cartoon text 1 (Metropoulos}
10 this text. laughter is generated by the sub....:ersion of OUT background
knowledge and inferential processe s that is effected by so. So functions as a
rhetorical operator to switch round OUT canonised. generalised stereotypic
knowledge schemata and inferences thereof. It appears. therefore. that so
quite often operates, not in vacuo. but on the fertile soil of our schcmatiscd
and 'universally' shared beliefs and knowledge. The joke owes its existence
to the conj unction of both linguistic factors and social knowledge. the
fanner skilfully operating on the latter to effectively subvert it. Laughter is
generated by this coercion effected by the use of the operator so on our
canonised schemata. This coercion seeks to totally subvert our schemata in
terms of their polarity (+ and -).
Despite the rather wide range of possible explanations of the function of
so. Biakemore's (or a relevance-theoretic] account does not capture the
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particular use of so that the cartoon text witness: neither can a Relevance-
theoretic account explain the generation of laughrer.
This flaw or inability of a relevance-theoretic treatment to account for such
intriguing. but not uncommon. uses of connectives is not part icular to $0
only. but. as we can see. spills over all connectives. A prime example would
be the case of and. a conn ective whose function woul d be explained.
according to Blakemore. in terms of compensating for the extra effort
required by process ing the conjunction (rather than each proposition
separately ) of the two propositions.
However. let's have a look at this adve rtisement:
Pythagoras' T heorem
contain s 24 w ords.
Archimedes' Prin ciple, 67.
Th e Ten Co m mandments. 179.
T be America n Declaration
of Ind epend ence, 300.
And recent legislation in
Europe concerning wh en
and where )'ou ca n sm oke,
24.942.
Phill ip M orris Eu ro pe S.A.
(The Economist. my emphasis)
Blakcmore ( 1989: 24) explains conjoined utterances as follows:
To say that the relevance of a proposition depends on the interpretation of another
is to say that each is consistent with the Principle of Relevance individually. In
contrast. a speaker who presents a conjoined proposition, say. of the form P and
Q. must have grounds for thinking that it has relevance over and above the
relevance of its conjuncts taken individually. This is not to say mat each conjunct
may not have its O\ \TI individual relevance. The point is mal a hearer of a
conjoined utterance receives no guarantee that each of the conjuncts is relevant.
She can orJy assume that it is the conjoined proposition that is consistent with the
Principle of Relevance.
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While this quotation seems to emphasise a reasonably grounded
explanation of conjunct ion, it does not provide an account of the impact of
the above advertisement which is owed almost exclusively to me use of and.
Moreover. since the desired impact of the advert is quite clea rly that of a
strong contrast betwee n the previous propo sitions and the last and-conjo ined
one. it is reasonable to expect that the paradigmatically contrastive
connective would be used- but. which is the contrastive connective par
excellence. Instead, and figures prominently in this ad effectively enhan cing
and multiplying the targeted impact. This is achieved partly by ridiculing the
conj unction of the propositions, an impact. which could not be achieved by
but. the contrastive connective par excellence . A Relevance-theoretic
account wi ll not go any further than what Blakemore has offere d, thus
failing to distingui sh between and account for uses of the conn ective and,
such as (4) and (5) ;
(4a) John went to college and Steve found a job.
(4b) Joe got pregnant and they got married.
(4c) John slipped and broke a leg.
(5a) She is married and she sleeps around.
(5b) Her husband is in hospital and she hangs around with friends.
Moreover, while we have encyclopaedic schemata to buttress all examples
of (4) • we have a schema for needing to be married when you have childre n,
or for injuring ourselves when slipping - we do not have a ready
encyclopaedic schema (for being married and sleeping around , or for wives
hanging around wi th friends whi le their husbands are in hospital) to buttress
the examples in (5). As Wilson and Sperbe r ( 1993) write, the crit erion of
consistency together with the principle of relevance .....i.ll guide the hearer to
derive adequate effect s fo r the minimum j ustifiable effort. In default of a
stereotypic encyclopaedic schema subsuming the conjunct ion of the
conjoined propositions under its scope, the question that is raised is to what
extent both principles o f con sistency and relevance are satisfied. Further,
since the principle of expending the minimum j ustifiable effon both on the
speake r's and the hearer's part has to be observed, one would expect the
choice of the connective but, the contrastive connec tive par excellence, in
cases where the speake r wishes to register a strong contrast between the two
propositions.
I now wish to examine what a Relevance-theoretic account would have to
say about the multi-faceted function of the so-called temporal connective
when . $&W consider concepts. such as when. which are cons idered non-
logical, as determining logical implications (87 ). It seems reasonable to
accept a relevance theoretic account for when-clauses, and indeed this
account wi ll suffice in cases of temporal or even relative when-clauses. But
how is Relevance Theory to cope with contrastive or even causa l uses of
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when-dauses? It seems quite clear to me that Relevance Theory may
provide an initial first-order analysis ofdata . but the question of the meaning
and funct ion of connectives is not exhausted thereby. In other words , what is
a principled way of distinguishing between purely temporal uses of when
and rhetorica l uses of this conj unction? This conjunc tion, just like and, is
used as a rhetorical operator to enhance the attitudinal mean ing of the
cons truction. It usually combines with either rhetorical questions or negated
propositions in a rhetorical construction. How can Relevance cope with such
meaning differentials? If when is considered to encode conceptual meaning,
it will have to be ass igned a diversity of meani ng spec ificatio ns ranging
from temporality to causality to hypo theticality 10 cone astingness (both in
English and in Greek with otan , its translationa l equivalent). If it is assigned
procedural meaning then the propositions it conjoins ....iIl have to be truth -
conditionally independent of its function . But then the occurrence of this
connective functi ons as an operator that can even suspend assignment of
truth evaluation to the propo sitions it conjoins. Examp les in (6) witness this .
diversity in meaning and function:
(6a) A furthe r di stinct ion between name s and descripti ons is drawn by
Russell when he notes that a name cann ot OCCllI signifi cant ly etc.
(6b) Thi s app arent paradox is promptly resolved when one considers
tha t in an asymmetrical situati on one of the participants actually wants
to mislead the other.
(6c) They may app ear to seek inform ation when in fact the information
is already known ..., or they may appear merely to seek confirmation
whe n in fact they seek information.
(6d) Tecc epc drcuc O"1I::on i:l9rI'(a \, orcv r.ru:n'llhl'\av aM co uucnc
cepoascvou :rou ccreaece.. .
(6e) Kut oe - Ooeii" +fliifio ii6ai ~ -'-iHiiib iao l Biae 6iio~ ~n~y6eii"b;
(6 f) Jloiov mit£ vn Xf.ian£. o rc v I3U1tou}l£ en miJ.L£pa vu j.lT]V qouv
OUJlMllPro9d o...-rw 9£:0£«;v"lpn.uyroywv a m VOJlO !:t ppwv;
(6g) Dmv £f11tUKEnll '1 }l£yu }..ur£PTl erciptc , orcv E1u:Jll3u ivel to
U1t01WYe:lO, ctuv U1tUPXe1 OvtWI; xolrcouc, Sev ~EPW 1\.0. 1tOlO ")..&yo Sev
nrcv °TJJlOOI£UatjlU.
(6h) c ovrcorett c 1[000 npovofl\.O. K'ij etvc t 1] a~io. "1~ ~EVT] '; eralpla.1;
crcv 1] wm KC1Ve\ ntv e~6pu~1] !
All this flings me back to the same que stion that I raised a very long time
ago ....i th regard to Grice's theory : this question concerns the issue of the
constrainability of our theories. While the examples I discussed are from the
domain of connectivity. this issue is not limited to connec tives but rather
concerns both Grice's lrnplicature theory and S&W's Relevance theory as
the unacceptability of the following exam ples w- itness:
Larry:
Jane t:
Larry:
(1) Janet:
Larry:
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(7) (Notice on house gate:)
Beware of the lion.
(8a) I climbed up the tree and pressed the bell.
(8b) I went up the stairs and picked the fruit."
As I argued elsewhere, I would propo se the consistent postulation of
structured sche mata or frames acting as constraints in accessing Relevance
in S&W 's or Blakemore 's sense . These knowledge schemata cann ot be
relegated to hearer's processing potent ial for relevanc e on the grounds of
those connectives alone irrespective of their availability. For if this were
the case, then one would not detect speaker's attempts at subverting tho se
schemata, thereby creating funny or 'unex pected' situations (advertisement,
cart oon). Neither could one explain the powerful use of and we singled out,
nor why and is more powerful, and there fore preferred in thi s use, than but
or although. Equating this conceptual dynamics of connectives with their
function ident ified in Kitis (198 2) as 'orientating signals', or as developed by
Schiffrin ( 1987) as discourse markers, or with Blakemore's procedural
meaning, is to jettison a great deal of conceptual generality in favour of
methodological simplici ty and elegance. The structuration and development
of a typology of consistent and predictab le models for such frames and
schemata is hardly a task for a lingu ist. However, this is no excuse for not
acknowledging their role as systematic and powerful constraints in language
produc tion and interpreta tion.
Another problem that arises and has been hardly treated within a Relevance
framework is the issue of Globality: Re levanc e has been shown to operate
loca lly.' However, it has long been shown (Kit is, 1982, Schiffrin, 1987 ) that
connectives can operate at a global level, too. And one cannot account
uniformly for cases of connectives such as some of the ones examined here
and (i) in the following conversational segment:
(9) Janet : Guess why I'm calling.
LaITy: I: know cuz I didn't do my math.
Janet: Well- u - how w'd l know. I wasn't et th' school
today.
Oh.
Righl?
Righ t.
hhh But I am calling about math.
I knew it:
(real data, drawn from Koutoupis-Kit is. 1982)
"For discussion see Kitis (l9 87a,b)
5For criticismon this issue see Kitis (forthcoming[a]).
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5. Co ncl usion
In this paper I presented some problems that a theo ry of Relevance \..i ll find
rather difficult to tackle . These problems haw been demonstrated with
reference to connectives . which happen to attract m) interest in part icular .
The major problem is the issue of unac countability of the systema nci ry of
background knowledge tha t both speakers and hearers bring to bear on both
language production and comprehension . In Relevance theory mention is
definite ly being made of the role played by background knowledge.
However, beyond a curso ry invocation le ft at the disposal of both speaker
and hearer of encyclopaedic knowledge schemata. little has been said about
the powerfu l constraints that these schemata place on language use. I think
that it is imperative that we appeal to rypologies of systematic knowledge
schemata tha t \\111 provide constraint s on language use. That such typ ologies
are hardly the linguist's task is no reason for glossing over their poten tial for
systematic constrainabiliry."
The issue of Globa lity pertaining to some uses of connectiv es also , in my
view , poses a seri ous problem for Relevanc e theory. Thi s problem wi ll
probably force an orientation towards a multi-level accoun t of connectives
corresponding to the ir multi-layered function in rea l conversat ional data
(Schiffrin. 1987).
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